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Abstract. What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority
or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible
that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results
from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to
severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are
more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking
the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”)
propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators
and predicates.
1 Introduction
Propositional attitudes such as knowledge and belief appear to have a subject and an
object. The subject is the person who knows or believes; the object is that which is
known or believed. But what kind of object is this? Two answers have been popular in
the more systematic branches of epistemology and philosophy of mind. The first identifies
objects of attitudes with something like sets of possible worlds. Sets of worlds capture
the conditions under which the relevant attitude is true (or accurate or satisfied), and
they come with a conveniently built-in boolean structure. On the other hand, cognitively
different attitudes such as a belief that 2 + 2 = 4 and a belief that there are infinitely
many primes, can be true under the very same conditions, and it is tempting to represent
this difference as a difference in content. This suggests modeling the objects of knowledge
and belief as something more like a sentence: the sentence ‘2+2 = 4’ is obviously different
from the sentence ‘there are infinitely many primes’.
Sentential accounts may also look attractive if our topic is not the modeling of doxastic
or epistemic states, but the semantics of ordinary-language attitude reports. In English,
for example, one may be able to truly assert ‘Jones believes that 2+2=4’ and yet deny
‘Jones believes that there are infinitely many primes’. The sentential functor ‘Jones
believes that —’ therefore does not operate on the truth-conditions of the embedded
sentence. For the present paper, I want to set this topic aside. I will be concerned with
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statements about propositional attitudes as they might occur in a systematic philosophical
or scientific theory. The fact that attitude reports in English are hyperintensional does
not refute theories that take the objects of attitudes to be sets of possible worlds. It
merely follows that the connection between attitudes, as modeled by the theory, and
ordinary-language attitude reports is not as tight as one might perhaps have thought.1
There is nothing special here about propositional attitudes. It is quite generally a
good idea to express systematic theories in a regimented language that may deviate from
ordinary usage e.g. by resolving ambiguities, minimising context-dependence and giving
stipulative, precise definitions to theoretically important terms. This is common practice
in science, and we should not shy away from it in philosophy.
The choice between sentences and sets of worlds also arises for other “modalities”
besides propositional attitudes. Necessity and apriority, for example, have often been
understood as either properties of sentences or properties of possible-worlds propositions.
The choice is also well-known for probability, although here the sets of worlds are usually
replaced by sets of more limited possibilities called ‘outcomes’. Via probability, the issue
arises all across science, from quantum mechanics and genetics to stochastic models in
economics.
This paper is about a somewhat technical problem for the choice of sentences as the
objects of a given modality. A classical form of the problem was presented in [Montague
1963], where Montague proved (in effect) that any reasonably powerful theory according
to which some sentential predicate P satisfies the following three principles is inconsistent
with basic arithmetic:
(1) P (A) ⊃ A;
(2) P (P (A) ⊃ A);
(3) if P (A), and A logically entails B, then P (B).
Consider knowledge, understood as a property of sentences. Uncontroversially, whenever
A is known, then A is true. At least for ideal subjects, it is also plausible that this fact
itself may be known, and that knowledge is closed under logical consequence. Montague’s
result suggests that at least one of these assumptions must be false.
The topic of Montague’s paper wasn’t knowledge, but theories of provability or ana-
lyticity as expressed in the language of modal logic. Carnap and Quine had suggested
that in modal logic, ‘2A’ should be understood as saying that the embedded sentence
A is provable or analytic. Montague argued that this interpretation would rule out the
corresponding combination of (1)–(3) and thereby many familiar systems of modal logic.
As [Skyrms 1978] demonstrates, this is not quite correct. One can interpret the box of
modal systems like S4 and S5 as a property of sentences without running into Montague’s
1 In defense of this view, see, among many others, [Lewis 1986: 32–34], [Stalnaker 1991], and [Bach
1997].
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problem. The reason is that the standard syntax of modal logic, which treats the box as
a sentence operator rather than a predicate, is not powerful enough to run Montague’s
proof.
This fact may be reassuring for certain interpretations of modal logic, but I don’t
think it is of much help when we talk about theories of knowledge or probability – if only
because such theories generally can’t be expressed in the standard language of modal
logic. When we go beyond the syntactical constraints of standard modal logic, we have
to face Montague’s result. I will argue that this puts more serious pressure on sentential
treatments of modalities than is commonly acknowledged.
I will begin with a more careful presentation of Montague’s result. Montague’s proof
is closely related to earlier arguments due to Gödel, Tarski and Löb concerning the
notion of provability in mathematical theories. Further results along similar lines have
since been proved e.g. in [Thomason 1980b] and [Smullyan 1986], and I will add a few
observations of my own. Afterwards, we will return to the question of what all this might
tell us about knowledge, belief, apriority or probability.
2 Theme and Variations
Let me be a bit more precise than I have been so far. We will be concerned with theories
of knowledge, belief, apriority or some other “modality”. Until further notice, I assume
that a theory of this kind can be identified with a logically closed set of sentences in a
first-order language L . As usual, I write `T A to say that A is a member of the theory
T . To bring out the inconsistency with basic arithmetic, I assume that L includes the
standard vocabulary of arithmetic, so that it can express things like 2 + 2 = 4.
A theory is arithmetically sound if it does not contain any arithmetical falsehoods (like
2 + 2 = 5). The set L of logical truths, for example, is arithmetically sound, but it also
contains very few arithmetical truths. A more informative theory is Robinson Arithmetic,
also known as Q. Q can be axiomatised by five or six simple and uncontroversial statements
about numbers, which can be found in any textbook on mathematical logic, see e.g.
[Boolos et al. 2007: ch.16].2 If a theory contains these axioms, it is called an extension of
Q. A famous extension of Q is Peano Arithmetic, PA.
Most of our results will follow more or less directly from a certain fact about numerical
relations, i.e. relations between natural numbers. To state this fact, we need some more
2 In standard formulations of Q, it is not made explicit that the quantifiers range only over numbers. The
fact that every number has a successor, for example, is expressed as something like ∀x∃y(x+ 1 = y).
Since we are interested in theories that also talk about, say, persons, I assume that the restriction is
officially made explicit. Thus ∀x∃y(x+1 = y) turns into something like ∀x(Nx ⊃ ∃y(Ny∧x+1 = y)).
I will, however, generally leave the restriction implicit when I sketch proofs, since it tends to add a
distracting layer of syntactic complexity.
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terminology. A numerical relation R is called recursive if there is a mechanical algorithm
to check, for any given numbers, whether they stand in this relation to one another or
not. R is recursively enumerable if there is an algorithm for listing all and only the
numbers that stand in the relation to one another. R is weakly representable in a theory
T if there is a formula A(x1, . . . , xn) such that, for all numbers i1, . . . , in, R(i1, . . . , in) iff
`T A(i1, . . . , in).3 R is strongly representable in T if there is a formula A(x1, . . . , xn) such
that whenever R(i1, . . . , in), then `T A(i1, . . . , in), otherwise `T ¬A(i1, . . . , in). Here is
the fact.
Lemma 1 (Representation Lemma). (i) Every recursive relation is strongly repre-
sentable in any extension of Q. (ii) Every recursively enumerable relation is weakly
representable in any arithmetically sound theory.4
The main use of Lemma 1 is to prove Lemma 2. To this end, we first associate, in some
systematic manner, each expression A of L with a number pAq (using, for example, the
code numbers of UTF-8). pAq is called the Gödel number of A. Lemma 1 then implies
Lemma 2 (Diagonal Lemma). If T is an extension of Q, then for any L-formula
A(x) there is a sentence G such that `T G↔ A(pGq).
In other words, for any predicate A(x) expressible in our language L , there is a sentence
G which “says of itself” that it satisfies the predicate, in the sense that, according to
T , G is true iff A(pGq) is true. G is constructed as follows. Consider the function that
maps any formula Φ(x) to its “diagonalisation” Φ(pΦq). The corresponding function on
Gödel numbers is recursive, and hence according to Lemma 1 strongly represented in any
extension of Q by some formula diag(x, y). Now given a formula A(x), define G as the
diagonalisation of ∃y(diag(x, y) ∧A(y)). It is then easy to show that `T G↔ A(pGq).
All sorts of interesting things follow immediately from these two lemmas. For a simple
illustration, let T be a theory which, for some predicate P (x), satisfies all instances of
`T P (pAq) ⊃ A, and(T)
If `T A then `T P (pAq).(RN)
If T is an extension of Q, then by lemma 2 there is a sentence G such that `T G ↔
¬P (pGq). Together with (T), this implies that `T P (pGq) ⊃ ¬P (pGq); so `T ¬P (pGq).
But then `T G, because `T G ↔ ¬P (pGq), and then `T P (pGq) by (RN). So T is
inconsistent. Thus we’ve proven “Theorem 3” in [Montague 1963]:
3 By A(i1, . . . , in) I mean the formula that results from A(x1, . . . , xn) by replacing each xj with the
standard numeral for the number ij in L .
4 See e.g. [Boolos et al. 2007: ch.16] for a proof of (i), and [Machover 1996: 258f.] for (ii).
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Theorem 3. If T is a consistent extension of Q, then it cannot satisfy all instances of
(RN) and (T).
To remove clutter, I will henceforth write 2A for P (pAq), and 3A for ¬P (p¬Aq).
(RN) and (T) can then be written in a form that you may recognize from modal logic:
`T 2A ⊃ A;(T)
If `T A then `T 2A.(RN)
Here are some further principles that will play a role in what follows.
`T 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B);(K)
`T 2A ⊃ 3A;(D)
`T 2A ⊃ 22A;(4)
`T 3A ⊃ 23A;(5)
`T 2(2A ⊃ A) ⊃ 2A;(GL)
If 0T A then `T ¬2A.(RS)
I write (2X) for the necessitated version of the corresponding principle (X), and (CX)
for its converse, where applicable. For example, (2T) is `T 2(2A ⊃ A), and (CT) is
`T A ⊃ 2A. I say that a theory satisfies a schema like (T) or (RN) if all its instances
are true if this theory is chosen as T .
The following bunch of theorems are proved much like theorem 3 above.5
Theorem 4 (Tarski’s Theorem). If T is a consistent extension of Q, then it cannot
satisfy (T) and (CT), nor (RN) and (RS).
Theorem 5. If T is a consistent extension of Q, then it cannot satisfy any of the
combinations
(i) (RN), (K), (4) and (5);
(ii) (RN), (K), (4) and (D);
(iii) (RN), (K), (24) and (D);
(iv) (RN), (K), (2T) and (C5).
Theorem 6 (Löb’s Theorem, formalised). If T is an extension of Q and satisfies
(RN), (K) and (4), then it satisfies (GL).
5 See e.g. [Boolos et al. 2007] for proofs of theorems 4 and 6, and [Smullyan 1986] for results along the
lines of Theorem 5. 5.(iv) plays a central role in [Koons 1992].
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As I mentioned in the introduction, the original investigations into the present territory
concerned the notion of provability in formal mathematical theories. Since Peano Arith-
metic, for example, has a recursive set of axioms, membership (equivalently, provability)
in PA is recursively enumerable. By Lemma 1, it follows that there is an arithmetical
predicate P (x) that weakly represents, in PA, the property of being a (Gödel number of
a) member of PA. That is, for all arithmetical sentences A,
(RN+) `PA A iff `PA P (pAq).
The left-to-right direction of this is (RN). Since PA is consistent, Theorem 4 entails that
no predicate strongly represents membership in PA. Hence there are sentences G such
that 0PA G and 0PA ¬P (pGq). By (RN+), 0PA G entails 0PA P (pGq), so PA can neither
prove nor disprove P (pGq). This is Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Investigating
further into the predicate P (x), one can show that PA satisfies (K) and (4). By theorem
6, this gives us (GL). Now suppose `PA ¬P (p⊥q), equivalently: `PA 2⊥ ⊃ ⊥. By
(RN+), then `PA 2(2⊥ ⊃ ⊥), so by (GL), `PA 2⊥, and then `PA ⊥ by (RN+). This is
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem: if PA can prove its own consistency, then it is
inconsistent.
If you look back at our proof of Theorem 3, you can see that T does not have to be
a purely arithmetical theory, nor does it have to be axiomatisable. More importantly,
P (x) (i.e., 2) can be any predicate whatsoever, irrespective of whether it represents
membership in T or whether it can be expressed in the basic language of arithmetic.
The same is true for theorems 4–6. They apply to knowledge, belief or apriority in a
philosophical theory T just as much as to provability in Peano Arithmetic. It might
therefore be a bit misleading when Montague [1963] speaks of “syntactical” treatments
of modality, which suggests that the relevant modality is defined syntactically, perhaps
as provability in a certain deductive system.
In a philosophical context, (RN) may be problematic. If 2 is interpreted as knowledge
or belief, (RN) says that every sentence in our theory T is known or believed. Whether
this is plausible depends on what else is in T . However, only a limited number of (RN)
applications are needed to prove the above theorems, and one can generally recover the
proofs by instead using necessitated versions of other principles, combined with (selected
instances of)
`T 2A, if A is a logical truth;(2L)
`T 2A, if A is an axiom of Q.(2Q)
I write (QC) for the combination of (2L), (2Q) and (K). (QC) amounts to the claim
that 2 is closed under Robinson Arithmetical consequence. Here is an (RN)-free analog
of Theorem 3 that brings us close to the result mentioned in the introduction.
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Theorem 7. If T is consistent, then it cannot satisfy (QC), (2T) and (T).
Note that we no longer require T to be an extension of Q. Theorem 7 can be proved
as follows. By the diagonal lemma, `Q G ↔ ¬2G. Hence `L Q ⊃ (G ↔ ¬2G), with
L the set of logical truths and Q the conjunction of the axioms of Q. By (2L), then
`T 2(Q ⊃ (G ↔ ¬2G)), and thus by (K) and (2Q), `T 2(G ↔ ¬2G). Now assume
T satisfies (2T). Then `T 2(2G ⊃ G). Together with `T 2(G ↔ ¬2G), this entails
`T 2¬2G and `T 2G (using (2L) and (K)). If T also satisfies (T), we get `T ¬2G,
which means that T is inconsistent.
If we suppose, in the last step, that T satisfies (4) instead of (T), we have `T 2¬2G
as well as `T 22G, which yields the main result of [Thomason 1980b] (although by a
simpler route):
Theorem 8 (Thomason’s Theorem). If T is consistent, then it cannot satisfy (QC),
(2T), (4) and (D).6
Along similar lines, it is not hard to verify the following.7
Theorem 9. If T is consistent, then it cannot satisfy any of
(i) (QC), (2T) and (C5);
(ii) (QC), (2K), (4), (24), (D) and (2D);
(iii) (QC), (2K), (4), (24), (C4), (2C4) and (D);
(iv) (QC), (2QC), (C5) and (2C5).
Theorem 10. If T satisfies (QC), (2K), (4) and (24), then it satisfies (GL).
Finally, let’s prove the Montagovian result discussed in the introduction.
Theorem 11 (Montague’s Theorem). If T is consistent with Q, then it cannot sat-
isfy (2L), (K), (T) and (2T).8
6 Thomason actually does not include (D) in the statement of his theorem in [Thomason 1980b]. In his
formulation, his theorem says that if T satisfies (2L), (K), (2T) and (4), then `T 2Q ⊃ A for all
formulas A. As indicated by the first sentence right after his proof sketch, however, he probably meant
`T 2Q ⊃ 2A. At any rate his proof sketch does not support the stronger conclusion. [Thomason 2011]
contains an even more puzzling formulation of the theorem, using `T 2Q ⊃ 2A as the conclusion, but
with a weaker version of (K) and with (C4) in place of (4). Since (C4) is a consequence of (QC)+(2T),
this is again strictly stronger then Theorem 8, and I don’t know how it is supposed to be proved.
Confusingly, Thomason refers to [Thomason 1980a] for further information about this alleged result,
but as far as I can tell, the theorem is not even mentioned there.
7 Theorem 9.(i) follows immediately from the considerations in support of Theorem 7; for (ii)–(iv), it
helps to first establish Theorem 10, which can be done by modifying the proof of Theorem 6 in the
way we have just modified the proof of Theorem 3 to reach Theorem 7.
8 This is closely related to “Theorem 1” in [Montague 1963]. Montague actually uses a slightly weaker
version of (K), and assumes that T extends Q.
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Here we have to make a somewhat different use of the diagonal lemma. Consider the
function f that maps the Gödel number of any expression A to the Gödel number of
Q ⊃ ¬A. Since f is recursive it is represented in Q by some formula F(x, y). Applying
the diagonal lemma to the predicate ∃y(F(x, y) ∧ P (y)), we get a sentence G such that
`Q G ↔ ∃y(F(pGq, y) ∧ P (y)). Moreover, `Q ∀y(F(pGq, y) ↔ y = pQ ⊃ ¬Gq). So `Q
G↔ P (pQ ⊃ ¬Gq). In other words, `Q G↔ 2(Q ⊃ ¬G). Hence `L Q ⊃ (G↔ 2(Q ⊃
¬G)). By propositional logic, this entails `L (2(Q ⊃ ¬G) ⊃ (Q ⊃ ¬G)) ⊃ (Q ⊃ ¬G).
Now suppose T satisfies (2T) as well as (2L) and (K). Then we get `T 2(Q ⊃ ¬G).
And since `L Q ⊃ (G↔ 2(Q ⊃ ¬G)), we then have `T Q ⊃ G. If T also satisfies (T),
this means that `T Q ⊃ G and `T Q ⊃ ¬G, yielding `T ¬Q: T is inconsistent with Q.
I went through an unusually large number of theorems, in part because different
principles are plausible for different modalities. Montague’s Theorem, for example, puts
pressure on sentential treatments of knowledge, but not so much on treatments of thought
or belief, for which condition (T) may be regarded as unrealistic. Another reason for
giving so many results is to make clear that the problems are not generated by some
particular principle such as (2T), which figures prominently in both Montague’s and
Thomason’s Theorem. If we want to treat knowledge or belief as a predicate of sentences,
we are not safe by giving up (2T). In light of Theorem 9, for example, it looks like we
also have to give up the “positive introspection” principle (4) or its necessitation (24).
Is there a general pattern behind our results? They all involve either a principle for
“adding a box” – (RN), (CT), (4), (5) – or for “removing a box” – (T), (2T), (C4), (C5).
Most, but not all, involve both. However, not every such combination is problematic. For
example, the combinations (QC) + (T) + (4) and (RN) + (K) + (4) are known to be
consistent, and indeed sound for provability in PA (the former with respect to complete
arithmetic, the latter with respect to PA itself; see [Solovay 1976]).
None of the theorems above assume that the relevant modality is recursive, or recursively
enumerable. The latter, however, is not implausible for knowledge, belief or provability.
Suppose an agent has an arbitrarily large but finite number of “explicit” beliefs, and that
we identify their total beliefs with everything that is a (first-order) logical consequence
of the explicit beliefs. Then the set B of believed sentences is a recursively enumerable
theory. By Lemma 1, membership in B is weakly represented in B itself by some purely
arithmetical predicate P (x), provided that the agent does not believe any arithmetical
falsehoods. Much like in the case of provability in PA, it then follows that there are
sentences G such that 0B G and 0B ¬2G. Hence our theory of belief T cannot satisfy
(5). Worse, suppose the agent believes the axioms of Peano Arithmetic. Then B is an
axiomatisable extension of PA. One can then show that PA satisfies (RN), (K) and (4)
with respect to the predicate P (x).9 If our theory of belief extends PA, it follows by
9 The reasoning is completely parallel to the reasoning that shows that PA satisfies (RN), (K) and (4)
with respect to the predicate that represents provability in PA, see e.g. [Boolos 1993: ch.2].
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theorem 5 that we can’t even have (D), and by Theorem 6 that we must have (GL), and
hence `T 2¬2A ⊃ 2A. This suggests that there can be no sentence the agent doesn’t
believe of which they believe that they don’t believe it!
Before we move on, it may be worth pointing out how the above results apply to
probabilities. The simplest application is to read 2A as P (A) = 1. Standard probability
theory guarantees that probability 1 is closed under logical consequence. Theorem 11,
for example, thus suggests that either some false sentence must have probability 1 or
there are sentences for which there is a positive probability that they have probability 1
despite being false: either `T P (A)=1∧¬A or `T P (P (A)=1∧¬A) > 0. It follows that
there can be no probability function that assigns 1 to all truths and 0 to all falsehoods.
We can also prove some further facts, going beyond the general theorems above. For
example, if the axioms of Q have probability 1, then by the diagonal lemma there is a
sentence G such that P (G↔ P (G) < 1) = 1. It follows that if P (P (G) = 1) = 1, then
P (G/P (G) = 1) = 0, and if P (P (G) = 1) < 1, then P (G/P (G) < 1) = 1. Either way,
the principle of synchronous reflection, P (A/P (A) = x) = x must fail.
3 Dire Straits
In the previous section, we effectively used Gödel numerals as names for sentences: to say
that a sentence A is known, we would say P (pAq), which applies a knowledge predicate
P (x) to the standard numeral of the Gödel number of A. An easy way to prevent
the ensuing disasters is to use designated quotation instead. Suppose we introduce,
for each sentence A, a new singular term ‘A’ that denotes A (rather than pAq). The
diagonal lemma still gives us a sentence G such that `T G ↔ ¬P (pGq), but we don’t
get `T G↔ ¬P (‘G’). So if we express our modal principles with designated quotation
rather than Gödel numerals, we are safe.10
Unfortunately, this isn’t much of a solution. First of all, there is a simple algorithm
for translating between sentences and their Gödel numbers. Let encode be the function
that turns a sentence into its Gödel number, and decode the inverse function that turns
a Gödel number into the corresponding sentence. If our theory T can say a little bit
about the syntax of sentences, it will inevitably have an expression decode(x, y) that
represents decode, in the sense that for any sentence A, `T decode(pAq, ‘A’).11 But then
the diagonal lemma gives us e.g. a sentence G such that `T G↔ ∃x(decode(pGq, x) ∧
10 See [Schweizer 1992: sec.3] for a detailed exposition of this strategy.
11 For example, with the Gödel numeration schema from [Boolos et al. 2007], decode(x, y) can be
defined from three predicates Var, Pred and Char, where Var(q, n) says that q is the n-th variable of
L , Pred(q, n,m) that q is the n-th m-ary predicate, and Char(q, n, r) that the n-th character of q is r.
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¬P (x)). And then we simply re-run the proofs from the previous section with such
slightly more complicated instances.
More generally, the arithmetical version of the diagonal lemma is just a particularly
simple and well-known instance of a more general fact. Analogous lemmas can be proved
in sufficiently strong versions of set theory, the lambda calculus, or theories of syntax.
Identifying sentences with Gödel numbers is a convenient trick to stay in the well-charted
territory of arithmetic; it is in no way essential to the formal results. We could just as
well have taken a sufficiently strong theory of syntax as our basis, or a combination of
minimal syntax and arithmetic, as in the previous paragraph.
Another initially plausible reaction to the results of section 2 starts from the observation
that almost all of them assumed either (RN)+(K) or (2L)+(K), and thereby that the
relevant modality is closed under logical consequence. Some modalities like knowledge
and belief are arguably not closed under logical consequence.
Unfortunately, giving up closure does not help much either. One reason for this is
pointed out in [Cross 2001]. Let P (x) stand for knowledge, and suppose it does not
have the closure property (2L)+(K). Now extend P (x) to (finite) lists of sentences
so that P (pA1, . . . , Anq) means that each of A1, . . . , An is known. Then consider the
derivability relation that holds between a list A1, . . . , An and a sentence B iff (A1 ∧
. . . ∧An) ⊃ B is provable in first-order logic. The corresponding relation between Gödel
numbers is recursively enumerable and thus weakly represented in any arithmetically
sound theory T by some arithmetical predicate deriv(x, y). Finally, define P ′(x) as
∃y(P (y) ∧ deriv(y, x)). P ′(x) expresses the property of being entailed by things that
are known. We need not assume that this captures any intuitive sense of knowledge
or “rational commitment”. However, P ′(x) is guaranteed to be closed under logical
consequence. So Theorem 11, for example, entails that it must violate either (T) or (2T)
– blaming closure is no longer an option. But (T) and (2T) look just as plausible for
P ′(x) as for P (x).
Another reason why rejecting closure is of little help is that only a few specific instances
of (2L) and (K) are used in the proofs of section 2. Instead of assuming that knowledge
is in general closed under logical consequence, we can assume that our agent actually
performed the relevant deductions, and satisfies whatever further conditions are required
to know the conclusions. For example, in the proof of Theorem 7, we assumed that the
agent knows the axioms of Q and inferred that they know the Q-theorem G ↔ ¬2G.
Without closure, knowledge of the axioms does not entail knowledge of the theorem. But
then imagine the agent just competently deduced G↔ ¬2G from the axioms of Q. In
this case, surely, we might have knowledge of G↔ ¬2G, and so we can continue with
the proof of Theorem 7.
It is worth noting that nowhere in the previous section was it assumed that T consists
of universal truths about the nature of the relevant modality. T may be any theory
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whatsoever. It may be a normative theory about knowledge, or a theory that describes
the knowledge of some particular agent in some particular scenario. Whether or not
knowledge is in general closed under logical consequence is therefore really beside the
point. If knowledge always satisfies (T) and (2T), then in light of Montague’s Theorem
it can never be closed under logical consequence, nor can logical closure be a normative
ideal.
This point also applies to the other principles. Consider the role of (2T) in Thomason’s
Theorem, whose intended application is to rational belief. Here (2T) amounts to the
claim that the agent believes, for any sentence A, that they don’t falsely believe A. There
has been some discussion recently over whether this is a plausible constraint on rational
belief. But this is the wrong question. If we want to hold on to the other principles in
Thomason’s Theorem as general constraints on rational belief, we not only have to allow
for agents who violate (2T), we have to require the violation. We have to say that there
could not possibly be an agent whose rational beliefs satisfy (2T).
4 Retreat
Some of the results in section 2 can be reproduced using self-referential sentences of
English. For example, consider the so-called “Knower sentence”
This sentence is not known.
If the sentence is known, then it is false. So it is not known, for knowledge entails
truth. This is just what it says. So we’ve found out that it is true. So now we know it.
Contradiction. (Compare the proof of Theorem 3 on p.4.)
What went wrong? The first few steps seem unassailable: given that knowledge entails
truth, the Knower sentence can’t be known. Epistemic closure doesn’t seem to play any
objectionable role here. So we have to reject the last step, which uses an instance of (2T):
while it is true that if the Knower is known, then it is true (and hence not known), this
fact itself cannot be known. But this is surely peculiar: we’ve just proved the allegedly
unknowable fact!
At this point, the parallels to the Liar have certainly not escaped you. One of the
results in section 2, theorem 4, actually is the formal version of the Liar paradox. It
states that no modality can satisfy the truth-schema `T 2A ↔ A. The proof appeals
to a Liar-like sentence L which “says of itself” that it is not true, in the sense that
`T L↔ ¬2L.
A natural reaction to the Liar paradox is to declare the Liar sentence semantically
defective. After all, if it is false, it would have to be true, and if it is true, it would
have to be false, so it doesn’t seem to have a unique, determinate truth-value. It is also
well-known that various sensible procedures for assigning truth-values to sentences do
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not assign a stable truth-value to the Liar (see [Kripke 1975], [Gupta 1982], [Herzberger
1982]).
This points at a quite different way out: revise classical logic. Classical logic presupposes
that every sentence is either true or false, and not both. If some sentence is neither
true nor false, or both true and false, then certain principles of classical logic become
problematic. The formal results of section 2 are still true, of course, but they assume that
T is closed under classical consequence. If we only require closure in some non-classical
logic, it is possible to find arithmetically competent theories T that satisfy e.g. the
truth-schema `T 2A↔ A without containing every sentence whatsoever.
How does this response to the Liar carry over to other modalities such as knowledge,
belief, apriority or provability? The results in section 2 all employed the diagonal lemma
to construct some kind of “self-referential” sentence. However, the arithmetical form
of self-reference guaranteed by the diagonal lemma is semantically beyond reproach.
Moreover, in contrast to the Liar, interpreting the diagonal sentences for knowledge or
provability does not pose any immediate problems. If the relevant modality is recursively
enumerable, the corresponding diagonal sentence is in fact a straightforward arithmetical
equation. For provability in PA, this equation is even demonstrably true (and not false).
Rejecting Gödel’s Theorems on the grounds that the Gödel sentence is neither true nor
false would be seriously misguided.
What about the Knower sentence? Since knowledge, like arithmetical provability,
entails truth, this sentence can’t be false. But there is no obvious inconsistency in
assuming that it is true. On the other hand, suppose we want to model a conception of
knowledge on which analytical truths are always known. More simply, suppose our topic
is analyticity rather than knowledge. Since analyticity entails truth, the sentence that
says of itself that it is not analytic cannot be false. So it is true, and true in virtue of its
meaning. But then it is false, since it says that it is not true in virtue of its meaning.
Contradiction. This suggests that the sentence that says of itself that it is not analytic,
like the Liar and perhaps the Knower, is neither simply true nor simply false. So we
have a reason to weaken classical logic and thereby escape the consequences of section 2.
This kind of response to the Montagovian challenges for knowledge and belief has been
defended e.g. in [Asher and Kamp 1989] and [Koons 1992].
I have no serious objections to these accounts. But we should not trick ourselves into
thinking that there are special properties, perhaps including analyticity and knowledge,
about which one must reason in a non-classical logic. If we stipulate that the knowledge
predicate applies to arbitrary sentences of L and that it obeys (2L)+(K)+(T)+(2T),
we thereby preclude it from expressing any property. By a property I mean something
that simply divides the relevant class of objects into those that have it and those that
don’t. If the Liar or the Knower doesn’t have a determinate truth-value, this is because
it involves a semantically defective predicate that does not correspond to a determinate
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property. Moving to a non-classical logic allows us to have a word ‘knowledge’ (or ‘it is
known that’) that obeys the desired modal principles, but it does not vindicate the idea
that there is a genuine property that satisfies these principles.
In section 1, I distinguished the ordinary use of words from their use in a systematic
scientific, mathematical or philosophical theory. Various features of ordinary language,
including vagueness, ambiguity and context-dependence, have been argued to stand in
the way of assigning determinate truth-values to every sentence. We therefore shouldn’t
expect the logic of ordinary English to be classical. If an ambiguous sentence S is true
on one reading and false on another, then S and its negation may count as both true, or
as both untrue. However, if we want to develop a systematic theory on the topic of S,
the best option is to disambiguate S into two sentences S1 and S2, rather than switching
to a non-classical logic and saying that S is both true and false. Similarly, if it turns
out that the English word ‘knowledge’ is semantically defective, the best choice for a
systematic epistemology is to replace it with a better-behaved expression.
If we introduce an artificially regimented knowledge predicate into our theoretical
language L , the question arises whether the sentences that constitute the objects of
knowledge are sentences of L or sentences of (say) ordinary English. In the latter case,
knowledge directed at sentences involving the ordinary word ‘knowledge’ is not adequately
formalised by a box within a box, because our theoretical knowledge predicate is different
from the knowledge predicate in the “object language”, i.e. the language that constitutes
the objects of knowledge. We should then also reject the principle (T), for if A involves
the object-language knowledge predicate, then 2A may be true in T , while A is not even
a sentence of T . The results of section 2 are then no big surprise.
Some such separation between meta-language and object language is, to my mind,
a satisfactory solution for semantic predicates like truth or analyticity as they might
figure e.g. in a compositional semantics for English. It is also relatively unproblematic for
many uses of probability in science, as long as the relevant theory has no need to assign
probabilities to statements which themselves involve probabilities. But in other cases, this
solution looks quite radical. If knowledge, for example, is a relation to sentences, then it
is hard to see why one couldn’t in principle bear this relation to sentences involving a
non-defective predicate for knowledge. Why couldn’t we know the sentences of our own
systematic epistemology?
Following Tarski, we could try to alleviate this problem by introducing a whole hierarchy
of predicates. Sentences involving 20 can never be objects of 20, but they can still be
objects of 21. The problem with this is that the relevant phenomena usually don’t sort
themselves naturally into any such hierarchy. At what level of the belief hierarchy would
we find, for example, my belief that some of my beliefs are false?
The best solution, in my view, for sentential accounts of propositional attitudes is
to restrict the relevant modal principles. Again, this type of response is perhaps best
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known from the literature on truth. In Kripke’s [1975: p.715] “closed off” construction,
for example, the truth-schema `T 2A↔ A is replaced by `T (2A ∨2¬A) ⊃ (2A↔ A).
The antecedent 2A ∨2¬A excludes pathological sentences like the Liar. In the case of
knowledge or belief, a simple but drastic restriction would limit the relevant principles to
sentences that do not themselves contain a box. Various less drastic restrictions are also
possible, see e.g. [Schweizer 1992: sec.4] and [des Rivieres and Levesque 1986]. Of course,
this solution essentially means biting the bullet and accepting that ideal knowledge, for
example, cannot obey (2L)+(K)+(T)+(2T).
In this context, Löb’s Theorem (Theorem 6) presents a challenge of its own. Recall that
if we take P (x) to represent the logical closure of an agent’s beliefs, and the agent’s beliefs
form a recursively enumerable set that includes the axioms of Peano Arithmetic and no
arithmetical falsehoods, then it is provable in Peano Arithmetic that P (x) obeys (RN),
(K) and (4) (with respect to PA). We are not given the choice to replace these principles
by something weaker. Löb’s Theorem then gives us (GL). But (GL) looks absurd if we
read the box as belief: as mentioned above, it implies that there is no sentence which
the agent doesn’t believe of which they believe that they don’t believe it. We should
therefore reject logical closure as a general condition on belief. It still follows that an
agent cannot believe that their beliefs are consistent (see Theorem 5.(ii)), and hence that
there is no sentence for which it follows from the agent’s beliefs that this sentence does
not follow from the agent’s beliefs. What if an agent happens to have logically closed
beliefs? Then P (p¬P (pAq)q), where P (x) is still defined as the logical closure of the
agent’s beliefs, does not adequately express the claim that the agent believes that they
don’t believe A, because the second P occurs in an intensional context. The agent can
believe that they don’t believe A without believing that A does not logically follow from
something they don’t believe. (If the agent believes that their beliefs are logically closed,
then they really cannot believe that they disbelieve anything, as they cannot believe that
they are consistent.)12
5 Operators and predicates, sentences and propositions
In modal logic, combinations like (RN)+(T) or (RN)+(K)+(4)+(5) have been studied
in great detail, and no-one doubts their arithmetical consistency. The main difference
between these systems of modal logic and the systems discussed in section 2 is that modal
logic treats the box as a sentence operator rather than a predicate of sentences. A simple
12What if we read P (x) as a predicate for what the agent ought to believe (in some sense), or as what
beliefs would be warranted by their evidence (in some sense)? Plausibly, it is built into this notion
that the relevant set of sentences is both consistent and logically closed. If it is recursively enumerable,
it follows that there is no sentence of which the agent ought to believe that they ought not to believe
it. This seems wrong. Presumably we should deny that the set of sentences the agent ought to believe
is recursively enumerable.
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and popular way to escape the Montagovian problems is therefore to formulate theories
of knowledge, belief, necessity etc. with operators rather than predicates.
Philosophically, the distinction between operators and predicates looks a bit super-
ficial. In standard models of modal logic, sentences are assigned truth-values relative
to evaluation points (“worlds”); relative to a given point w, 2A is true iff A is true at
all accessible points. The box in 2A therefore expresses a property of the set of points
at which A is true, namely that it contains all accessible points. From a semantical
perspective, the box is a predicate. This is even more obvious in provability logic, where
2A is read as saying that the sentence (assigned to) A is provable in a certain formal
system. The merely orthographical difference between ‘2A’ and ‘P (A)’ or ‘P (‘A’)’ is
surely of no logical significance.
What, then, rescues modal systems like (RN)+(T) from the clash with basic arithmetic?
Recall that to get our theorems going, we diagonalised a formula like ∃y(diag(x, y) ∧
¬P (y)), which gave us a sentence G such that `T G↔ ¬P (pGq). We can’t do that in
the standard language of modal logic, most obviously because we don’t have quantifiers
into the arguments of the box.
With this syntactical restriction in place, it is possible to give a sentential interpretation
of modal operators without running into the results of section 2. This is nicely demon-
strated in [Skyrms 1978] and [Cresswell 1985]. The basic idea of Skyrms and Cresswell
resembles the “metalinguistic” interpretation of quantifiers used e.g. in [Machover 1996].
On this account, variables are treated like individual constants; ∀xA(x) is true in a model
M iff A(x) is true in some model M ′ that differs from M at most in the interpretation
of x. Since there are no assignment functions, the formula A(x) is simply assigned a
truth-value. To evaluate ∀xA(x), we have to re-interpret the sentence A(x) in different
models. Skyrms and Cresswell show how to do the same with modal operators.13
So the lesson is that we can take the objects of (say) knowledge to be sentences of
our theoretical language L , and also endorse principles like (RN)+(T), as long as we
never quantify over the objects of knowledge. But this is a bit like defending geocentric
cosmology by refusing to look through telescopes. In ordinary talk, we commonly quantify
over the objects of knowledge, and it is hard to accept that we must stop doing so in any
systematic epistemology. We could never say that someone has come to know something,
or that some person knows things that others don’t.
Let’s return to theories in which we can quantify over the objects of modalities.
However, let’s not assume that these objects are sentences of L . What happens if the
objects are sentences in a different language, or sets of possible worlds, or Russellian
structured propositions?
13 Skyrms writes ‘∗Q(A)’ instead of ‘2A’, and suggests that Q(A) may be read as the quotation of A,
and ∗ as a sentential predicate. Paradox returns if one adds quantifiers into the position of ∗; see
[Schweizer 1987].
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Following the remarks at the beginning of section 3, I will assume, as I did with
sentences of L , that 2 is actually a predicate of numbers which somehow encode the
actual objects of the modality. Now suppose, for a simple illustration, that we read 2A
as attributing a certain property not to the syntactical entity A, but to its truth-value.
We can encode truth-values by the standard Gödel numbers 0 (false) and 1 (true). For
concreteness, let the box express the property of being equal to 1. 2A can then be
expressed in the language of arithmetic as ‹A› = 1, where ‹A› is the standard numeral
for the truth-value of A. It is easy to verify that this renders all instances of (2L), (K),
(T) and (2T) true. For example, since all logical truths are true, every instance of (2L)
reduces to the single sentence 1 = 1, which is true. For another example, every instance
of (T) has either the form 1 = 1 ⊃ A, where A is true, or 0 = 1 ⊃ A, where A is false.
Again, these are all true. So, on this reading of the box, first-order arithmetic satisfies the
Montagovian combination (2L)+(K)+(T)+(2T), and it does so without any artificial
syntactical limitations.
Why does this reading of the box escape Montague’s result? Couldn’t we use the
“decode” trick from section 3 again? Let’s try. Let val be the function that maps (the
Gödel number of) a sentence to (the Gödel number of) its truth-value. Let T be an
arbitrary theory, and suppose val is (strongly) represented in T by some formula val(x, y).
Then we can re-run all the proofs of section 2, using e.g. the diagonal sentence G such
that `T G↔ ∃x(val(pGq, x) ∧ ¬P (x)) where we previously used the sentence G with
`T G↔ ¬P (pGq). Here, val plays a parallel role to decode in section 3. However, Lemma
1 guarantees that the decode function is represented in any reasonably strong theory T ,
because decode is recursive. This is not true for val. In fact, the present considerations
show that val is not recursive, and, more strongly, not representable in any arithmetically
sound theory. (A more familiar argument to this conclusion goes via Tarski’s Theorem.)
The situation looks similar if we replace truth-values with sets of possible worlds. Since
arithmetical facts are not contingent, all arithmetical sentences express either the empty
set or the set of all worlds. Encode these two sets as the numbers 0 and 1. If L can also
express contingent facts, assign arbitrary numbers to the other sets of worlds expressible
in L . Again it is easy to show that the function that maps (the Gödel number of) every
sentence to (the Gödel number of) the corresponding set of worlds is not representable in
any arithmetically sound theory.
On the other hand, suppose we take the objects of modalities to be sentences of some
language L ′, which may or may not be identical to L . So 2A attributes a certain
property (being known, for example) to a certain sentence of L ′. Now presumably there is
some kind of systematic relationship between the sentence A here and the corresponding
L ′-sentence that constitutes the object of the modality. More precisely, there will some
encoding of L ′-sentences such that the relation between Gödel numbers of L-sentences
and the Gödel numbers of the corresponding L ′-sentences is recursive. But then it follows
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by Lemma 1 that this relation is (strongly) represented in every theory that comprises a
minimum of arithmetic. And thus we can re-run the proofs in section 2.
Similarly for other candidate objects of modalities. In particular, suppose we introduce
“impossible worlds” to the possible-worlds framework, so that we can assign different
sets of worlds to different logical truths. Most simply, this could be done by defining
worlds as arbitrary sets of L-sentences. Then we could assign to any sentence S the
set of “worlds” that contain S. But now encode every such set by the Gödel number of
the corresponding sentence S. The relation between Gödel numbers of sentences and
Gödel numbers of the sets of worlds expressed by those sentences is then represented in
basic arithmetic by the identity predicate, which brings back all the Montagovian results.
More generally, if enriching the space of worlds is supposed to help with the “problem
of logical omniscience”, there will presumably be some encoding relative to which the
relation between L-sentences and the corresponding sets of worlds is recursive.14 It is
not enough to allow that different L-sentences can express the same set of worlds, as
long as there is an algorithm for deciding which sentences express the same set of worlds.
To avoid the Montagovian results, there would have to be no encoding relative to which
the relation between sentences and sets of worlds is recursive, or recursively enumerable,
or even just representable in complete first-order arithmetic.
The fact that all logical and mathematical truths express the same possible-worlds
proposition is often considered to be the main weakness of possible-worlds account. Here
it is precisely this feature that saves the day.
6 Revenge?
It is sometimes pointed out, following [Asher and Kamp 1989], that possible-worlds
treatments do not ultimately avoid the Montagovian results, because the problems return
as soon as we add to our language a predicate for the expression relation between sentences
and propositions. The fact that this relation is non-arithmetical in the possible-worlds
framework only means that it is not automatically represented in any theory of sufficient
arithmetical power. But we may still be tempted to add a new, non-arithmetical predicate
to our language that represents this relation. And that is all we need to re-run the
arguments of section 2.
However, the temptation to add an expression predicate should be resisted. As
mentioned above, the expression relation is not representable in any arithmetically sound
theory. If we add the predicate to a theory of sufficient arithmetical strength, we only
render the theory inconsistent. We shouldn’t do that.
14 Some impossible-worlds accounts only aim at modeling inconsistent belief, without addressing the
problem of logical omniscience (e.g. [Restall 1997], [Berto 2010]). Depending on the details, these
accounts may not be subject to the Montagovian limitations.
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The problem can be illustrated with a self-referential sentence of English. Consider
the following sentence – call it E:
This sentence (actually) expresses the empty set.
Suppose E expresses the empty set and hence is true. Then the actual world is a member
of the proposition expressed by E. But the actual world isn’t a member of the empty set.
So E is false. This means that E is true at some world w. But then it is true at w that
E expresses the empty set at the actual world, which entails that E actually expresses
the empty set. Contradiction.
So it is true that a possible-worlds account of, say, knowledge is threatened by paradox
if one adds an expression predicate. But this is because every theory whatsoever is
threatened by paradox if one adds such a predicate. To be sure, it would be convenient
if we could have a well-behaved, full-fledged expression predicate in a possible-worlds
account. Since we can’t, we have to make do with a stratified predicate that is not
applicable to sentences containing itself, or with a predicate that does not represent
the expression relation for pathological sentences like E. Either choice is, I think, good
enough for a satisfactory theory of knowledge or belief.
[Koons 1992] argues that the Montagovian paradoxes, at least for rational belief, do
not depend on a sentential treatment, because one can find empirical substitutes for the
sentence G that figures in the proofs of section 2. It is easy to find instances of G↔ ¬2G:
any true sentence which the agent does not rationally believe will do. But `T G↔ ¬2G
by itself is harmless. We typically also need the necessitated `T 2(G↔ ¬2G). Here I
do not find Koons’s examples very convincing. They mostly involve things like an action
that is “irrational if and only if it is not irrational” (p.17), which strikes me as obviously
impossible.
I do not want to rule out the possibility of epistemic dilemmas: situations in which
some epistemic norm entails that an agent ought to believe a proposition A, while another
(or even the same) norm entails that they must not believe A. If there are such dilemmas,
this would raise interesting issues for the logic of rational belief. Among other things,
it would show that principle (D) is problematic if the box is read as “ought to believe”.
It might also show that an agent’s epistemic obligations are not closed under logical
consequence – otherwise the fact that they ought to believe A and also ought to not
believe A would seem to entail that they ought to make true every proposition whatsoever.
Nevertheless, these issues are quite different from those raised by the Montagovian results.
[Prior 1961] also discusses paradoxes for propositional attitudes that do not rely on a
sentential treatment. Suppose Mr.X, who believes himself to be in room 6, thinks that
nothing presently thought in room 7 is true. Suppose further that Mr.X is in room 7,
and nothing else is thought in room 7 at that time. Then it looks like what Mr.X thinks
is true iff it is not true. Prior concludes that the scenario of Mr.X is impossible.
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Let’s investigate this case from the perspective of a possible-worlds account. Let R
be the relation that holds between a possible world w and a set of worlds x iff x is the
content of a thought in room 7. In the world of Mr.X, call it w∗, the only thought in
room 7 is supposed to have the content p = {w : ∀x(wRx ⊃ w < x)}. It follows that
w∗ ∈ p iff ∀x(w∗Rx ⊃ w∗ < x) iff w∗ < p. Contradiction. Set theoretically, the status of p
is impeccable, assuming that R is a genuine relation between worlds and sets of worlds.
In general, for any relation R between (set-theoretic) individuals and sets of individuals,
there is a set of individuals p = {y : ∀x(yRx ⊃ y < x)}. However, this definition ensures
that no individual stands in R to p and to nothing else. The paradox arises when we
think of p as some fixed set, and consider the hypothesis that some individual stands
in R exclusively to this set. Consider a simpler analogy. Let q be a set of individuals,
and define p as {x : x < q}. For any choice of q, there is a corresponding set p. But
although we are completely free to choose any set of individuals as q, and although p will
always be a set of individuals, we can’t stipulate that q should be the set of individuals p.
Similarly in the case of Mr.X: since p is defined as {w : ∀x(wRx ⊃ w < x)}, there can be
no world at which Mr.X is thought-related only to p. On the possible-worlds account,
the scenario is indeed impossible. It seems possible, because we are tempted to think
of p as some fixed set of worlds (perhaps as whatever proposition Mr.X would express
by uttering “nothing presently though in room 7 is true”) and then wonder why Mr.X
couldn’t be thought-related to this proposition.
There is a lot more to be said about these puzzles. But we shouldn’t take it for granted
that all paradoxes involving truth, belief or knowledge are of a single kind. Prior’s
puzzles, for example, do not require any noteworthy modal principles at all. Hence
most of the strategies I have explored in sections 4 and 5 are of no use here. In the
other direction, a promising solution to Prior’s puzzles – explaining how a systematic
conception of the relevant modality renders the paradoxical situation impossible – is of
no use for the Montagovian problems, since these arise independently of any empirical
assumptions. Moving to sets of worlds helps to avoid the Montagovian limitations. It
does not magically solve every other puzzle and paradox along the way.
I am not suggesting that we should in general take sets of worlds (or truth-values)
to be the objects of modalities. Provability and syntactical well-formedness are clearly
properties of sentences. There are also properties in the vicinity of knowledge and belief
that uncontroversially apply to sentences. A classic example is Carnap’s explication of
belief in terms of dispositions to assent. All these properties are subject to the results of
section 2. Sometimes this is not a problem. Syntactical well-formedness, for instance,
clearly obeys none of (T), (C5) or (D), and clearly does obey (GL). In other cases, I
think the formal limitations are a significant cost. For example, it is hard to accept
that a systematic theory of apriority would have to give up one of (2L), (K), (T) and
(2T). In fact, it is natural to think that the logic of apriority should be S5, at least
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on some way of cashing out this notion. But then apriority cannot be a property of
sentences.15 Similarly, one might want the logic of ideal knowledge to be S4 (or at any
rate an extension of T), and one might want to have a notion of probability that makes
synchronic reflection at least formally possible, and that allows for “maximally accurate”
probability functions which assign 1 to every truth and 0 to every falsehood. In these
cases, it may be preferable to identify the objects of the relevant modality with something
like sets of possible worlds.
Some authors regard theories of knowledge, belief or probability as if they were
concerned with a determinate, special property (knowledge! belief !) with which we are
all intimately acquainted. But there are really a lot of properties out there, many of
which deserve to be studied. Consider belief. Almost everyone agrees that beliefs can be
evaluated for truth and falsity, and that they can be evaluated not just at the actual
world, but also under merely hypothetical conditions. This means that for every belief
there is an associated set of possible circumstances (“worlds”) at which the belief is true.
It should therefore be uncontroversial that wherever there is belief, there is a relation
to sets of possible worlds. This relation is the topic of possible-worlds accounts. When
people object to such accounts, they rarely give any reason to think that this relation does
not exist or that it is not worth studying. Their objections rather indicate that they are
thinking of a different relation, perhaps a relation between agents and certain structures
in their “belief box”, or a relation that holds between an agent and a sentence S iff one
can truly say in ordinary English that the agent “believes S”. The only competition here
lies in the theoretical virtues of theories dealing with these different relations.
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